By A Special Correspondent
First publised on 2021-04-09 06:56:30
In an excellent development, Maoists released the captured CoBRA commando Rakeshwar Singh Manhas in Chhattisgarh to the interlocutors that were pressed into service for his release. The administration acted with alacrity once it became known that the Maoists were willing to release the commando. It formed a team comprising local social workers and a few journalists. The commando was handed over to social worker Dharamlal Saini and tribal community leader Telam Boraiya, who were part of the team.
While this has to be commended as a life saved is a huge deal, the CRPF must climb down and admit that there were serious security and intelligence lapses in the whole operation. Even if one considers the fact that a lone villager could have tipped off the ultras about the presence of the security forces in the area, it is difficult to comprehend how the ultras could plan such a huge attack with over 400 cadres and arms at such short notice. It is clear that they had advance information about the movement of the battalion and planned the attack and laid the trap with precision. The informer network of the security forces failed grossly as it did not alert them about the impending attack.
There are several issues that need to be examined. The villagers in Maoist infested belts are crushed from both sides. The Maoists keep them subjugated in order to establish their primacy while the security forces treat them as traitors and harass them. In this never ending cycle, they get the worse from both sides. Further, when central forces are deployed in these areas, most jawans do not know the local language and customs and cannot ingratiate themselves with the villagers. Hence the villagers do not trust them and see them as oppressors. The very first requirement is to reassess whether local police should be entrusted with the task. If needed, special units of local policemen can be formed. The example of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana can be followed in this respect.
Secondly, the villagers have to be made partners in progress. The Maoists often win their trust by proving that they are victims of development. If the villagers are made partners in progress by getting jobs in projects that come up in their area, a lot of Maoist propaganda will fall by the wayside. But for that to happen, the government must look at the villagers and their needs with sensitivity and not leave them to their own devices despite usurping their land and the forests that provide them livelihood. The war against left-wing extremism can be won only by having the villagers on the side of the government and this can only be achieved if the projects in their areas bring prosperity to them. Otherwise, the Maoists will keep taking advantage of their subsistence level existence and win their trust.
Finally, the government must also move against the Naxalites while simultaneously working to get them to surrender. That is not as difficult as it looks. There have been instances in the past when, after a series of effective counter-insurgency operations, administrations in different states have been able to get ultras to surrender, either individually or in small groups. Mass surrenders have also happened in the past. The government must build pressure through counter-insurgency operations and form local committees of interlocutors who can keep talking to the ultras to get them to surrender. Left-wing extremism has to be tackled in various ways and just killing a few Maoists is not the way to do it.