By Sunil Garodia
First publised on 2026-11-21 02:00:35
SEBI's proposal to scrap the additional disclosure framework for offshore funds is a mistake in its present form. The regulator has made a competitiveness argument. It has not made an evidentiary one, and until it does, the proposal should not proceed.
On 20 November SEBI put out for public comment a proposal to remove the Additional Disclosure Framework in full. The framework has two triggers. It applies to FPIs holding more than 50% of their Indian equity assets in a single corporate group, and to FPIs holding, alone or with their investor group, more than Rs 50,000 crore of Indian equities, a threshold SEBI raised from Rs 25,000 crore in April 2025. The proposal withdraws both, along with the extra provisions for offshore derivative instrument subscribers and segregated portfolios. Comments are open until 11 December.
The framework was not adopted on a whim. The 2023 rules came while SEBI was examining offshore funds that held shares in the Adani Group. The group has denied the allegations made by Hindenburg Research, and nothing in this article assumes otherwise. The regulatory problem was structural, not personal. A standard beneficial-ownership test looks to ownership above a threshold, and a layered structure can in principle keep each layer below it. The 2023 circular required granular details of every entity holding ownership, economic interest or control in a covered fund. That was the gap it was built to close.
SEBI gives three reasons. The framework's granular disclosures run down to natural persons with no ownership threshold, which SEBI calls unique to India. India's beneficial-ownership thresholds of 10% or 15% are already stricter than the 25% ceiling the Financial Action Task Force recommends. And Press Note 2 of 2026, dated 15 March, clarified that a beneficial owner covers only those holding above the thresholds in the money-laundering rules, which in SEBI's view makes the extra requirement unnecessary.
The Press Note 2 argument is SEBI's strongest, and it deserves a direct answer. The size trigger was set to guard against circumvention of Press Note 3, the FDI restriction, so a revised definition of beneficial ownership speaks to it. The concentration trigger was aimed at a different risk, the circumvention of minimum public shareholding and takeover rules. SEBI itself said, in its April 2024 board memorandum on exempting companies with no identified promoter, that concerns about circumventing the takeover regulations would persist even where it relaxed the framework. A test based primarily on prescribed ownership thresholds, supplemented by applicable control criteria, is a different instrument from one that requires disclosure through every layer of an investment structure, irrespective of ownership thresholds. SEBI should explain how the revised definition catches a holding spread across several entities that each sit below the threshold.
SEBI also says existing norms suffice, which is a factual claim that a regulator must prove. How many FPIs complied with the framework? How many were granted exemptions? In how many cases did the disclosures reveal ownership structures or control relationships that would not otherwise have been identified? Public reporting on the proposal cites the principle and offers no such figures. A rollback justified by assertion should worry anyone who relies on this market.
The cost argument is also overstated. The framework was designed to reach a narrow class of funds. SEBI's original 2023 estimate put the potentially affected assets at about Rs 2.6 lakh crore, roughly 6% of FPI equity assets and under 1% of India's market capitalisation. SEBI has since narrowed it further. The aggregate holdings of qualifying FPIs in an apex company with no identified promoter, where they stay below 3% of its equity, now escape the extra disclosure. Certain university funds are carved out, and the size trigger was doubled to Rs 50,000 crore in April 2025. What remains is the concentrated, near-static holding pattern that prompted the rule in the first place.
The outflow figure deserves the same scrutiny. SEBI cites FPI withdrawals of more than Rs 5.61 lakh crore between October 2024 and October 2026 while arguing that India's disclosure requirements may be deterring foreign investment. But the regulator itself acknowledges that several factors contributed to those outflows. Without isolating the impact of the additional disclosure framework, the figure cannot establish that the rules were responsible for the exodus. A regulator should not rewrite a safeguard on a correlation.
The competitiveness argument fails on its own terms. Benchmarking India against the least demanding jurisdiction is a race to the bottom. Most funds that object do so over cost, and that is a fair complaint for those funds. It is not a case for removing the framework for the small class where concentration is the risk.
There is, however, another aspect of SEBI's argument that cannot be disputed: the underlying obligation to identify beneficial owners under anti-money-laundering law will remain in place. Duplicated compliance is a real waste if the base rules work. But that is the very point left unproven. If the base rules work, SEBI can show it with aggregate data. If they do not, the extra layer is doing necessary work.
There is a better path. SEBI should publish aggregate findings from the framework's operation, including the number of FPIs that complied, the number exempted, and the cases in which disclosures revealed ownership or control relationships that the standard test would not have identified. It should keep the framework for funds with concentrated single-group exposure. It should cut cost through standard templates, custodian-led collection and a single reporting channel. And it should attach a review clause so that any relaxation is tested against evidence within a fixed period. The chairman has said another consultation on India-specific restrictions on FPIs is coming, so the whole package should be judged together.
Verdict: the proposal is premature. A market earns foreign capital by being trusted, and trust is built by showing who owns what. SEBI should prove that its existing tools work before it removes the one that was added when they were doubted.








